As norms and tastes adapt to the social conditions shaped by policy variables, voters' opinions about these policies may evolve as well. We show how this process can lead to political instability. Moreover, if a politician's platform is shaped opportunistically so as to gain the majority's support, once in office the politician should not implement the promised policy in order to remain popular and get re-elected. Rather, the effective policy in this respect is the one which will be deemed optimal by most voters after the norms and opinions will adjust to that very policy.
Political instability is an inherent part of the democratic system. We are no longer surprised by a frequent change of elected leaders, nor by leaders not keeping up their campaign promises. At the same time we are also not surprised by frequent shifts in public opinion and the changing popularity of different policies or different politicians.
Adopting the paradigm of stable preferences and rational behaviour, the question is what are the sources of such instability? One obvious possibility is that different exogenous events, like war or economic cycles, affect voting patterns or the electeds' behaviour. Often there are new events that require different policies or different skills. Contemporary commentators usually argue in such a case that it is the Ôdaily reality' which forces leaders to change their recommended policies or forces the public to change its opinion. Another possible set of explanations relies on information revelation arguments. Sometimes while being in office, the actions of the elected reveal information about their personalities or abilities.
1 Voters may therefore reconsider their choices based on the leader's actions. Such processes, in turn, may affect the electeds' choice of policies or actions as they wish to signal their high competence.
2 Alternatively, individuals may change their vote when they have unrealistic optimism in believing the claims of outcumbents.
In this article we present a theory of political instability in which changing voting patterns or public opinion occur endogenously. Our model is based on the view that policies and institutions, along with their implications for incentives, may also influence the emergence of norms and the evolution of tastes and opinions. This point has been discussed already by Adam Smith, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx and John Stuart Mill; for recent surveys see Elster (1989) , Aaron (1994) and Bowles (1998) . The interplay between policies and tastes may therefore have an important role in shaping the dynamics of the political system, via the candidates' choice of * We thank Alex Cukierman and Allan Drazen for helpful discussion and the editor of this journal and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. 1 Or about expert analysis which is not directly available to the public or to competing candidates. 2 For examples of such political instability see Alesina and Cukierman (1990) , Canes-Wrone et al. (2001) , Cukierman and Tomassi (1998) , Harrington (1993) , Roemer (1994) , Rogoff (1990) and Schultz (2002). platforms and the actual policy implemented by the elected leader. In this study we show how this interaction may lead to endogenous political cycles or to deliberate discrepancies between promises and delivery of policy change.
The dynamics of opinions is the focus of many political studies, in which the standard approach is to conduct frequent polls that are designed to study changes in the public opinion and the popularity of different politicians or policies. Empirical research in political psychology suggests that voters' preferences regarding alternative courses of action are not fixed between (or within) election rounds (Zaller, 1991) . Thus the speed of such changes makes them relevant for the discussion on political instability. Gerber and Jackson (1993) present empirical evidence that opinions may be altered in response to policies and positions taken by different political parties. 3 The idea that life experience affects preferences via the accumulation of personal capital and social capital is already well established; see for example Becker (1976 Becker ( , 1996 and Akerlof (1983) . Preferences may evolve as a result of cultural transmission Feldman, 1973, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Verdier, 1998, 2001) , by which parents socialise and transmit their preferences to their offspring, motivated by some form of paternalistic altruism. A different modelling approach is the use of an evolutionary setup in which individuals imitate or learn from the Ôsuccessful' individuals in their society and eventually adopt their preferences. 4 Such an evolutionary approach has been useful in studying and justifying different types of preferences (such as altruism, status seeking, overconfidence etc.) that emerge from the dynamic process.
5
This suggests an important link between public policy and the evolution of values and norms. Public policy shapes the market conditions, which in turn may affect the prevailing norms. For example, different policies that encouraged women labour participation had an effect on feminist values and preferences with respect to family size. Aaron and Schwartz (1984) studied the physicians' attitude towards standards of care in the US and the UK. Their main finding is that the different resource constraints that physicians encounter in the two countries translate themselves into different views regarding standard of care. In particular, changes in the resources available to British physicians triggered not only a behavioural response in practice patterns, but also a change in their opinion and values. Wilson (1993) studied the problems of the urban underclass in the US. His 3 Gerber and Jackson (1993) studied the relationship between voters' preferences and party platforms regarding civil rights between 1956-64 and regarding the Vietnam War between 1968-72. In their model, voters' preferences shift in direct response to the actions of the different parties. See also Carmines and Stimson (1989) for an illustration of how leaders' actions regarding civil rights affect the public opinion on these issues. 4 In this approach the meaning of a Ôsuccessful' individual is exogenously given. However, most of the literature adopts the criterion of material payoffs for the definition of success. While such a choice is not necessarily realistic it serves as a discipline device. In any case, the evolutionary approach endogenises preferences and norms, but it requires an exogenous definition of a fitness function.
5 For a brief overview of this literature, see Samuelson (2001) . Examples include Gü th and Yaari (1992), Huck and Oechssler (1999) , Weiss (1997, 1998) , Bester and Gü th (1998) , Possajennikov (2000) , Bolle (2000) , Bergman and Bergman (2000) , Koçkesen et al. (2000a, b) , Guttmann (2000 Guttmann ( , 2003 , Sethi and Somanathan (2001) , Kyle and Wang (1997) , Benos (1998) , Heifetz and Segev (2004) , Heifetz, et al. (2005) , Dekel et al. (1998) , Dekel and Scotchmer (1999) , Robson (1996) , Rogers (1994) , Rotemberg (1994) and Vega-Redondo (1997) .
main claim is that the Ôunderclass problem' is not simply due to perverse incentives but is rooted in the fact that members of this group were Ôhabituated in ways that weaken their self control and their concern for others'. Wilson defines habituation as Ôthe process whereby people acquire a constant, often unconscious, way of doing something. . .'. This process is therefore a form of the preference dynamics described above. Wilson emphasises the distinction between Ôincentives' and Ôculture' and the immediate implications regarding the public policies that might be effective to counter the underclass problem.
6
As tastes and opinions are responsive to policy, so are the choices of individuals at the ballots. In order to study the different possible interdependencies between the political system and endogenous formation of tastes, we examine two kinds of political processes, which differ by the type of the participating politicians. According to a famous statement 7 by Margaret Thatcher there are two type of politicians; ÔConviction politicians' and ÔConsensus politicians'. Conviction politicians are politicians that have a strong, fixed political agenda, while consensus politicians are ones that are going to change their policy every time there is a shift in the public opinion. 8 First, we consider the political equilibrium that emerges when there are two conviction politicians, each of whom holds a firm view regarding her suggested public policy. We demonstrate a situation in which voters favour one policy and vote for one candidate, but the implementation of this policy triggers a change of tastes. The new preferences affect the individuals' votes in the next round of elections, and we show the possibility of a sufficient change in the people's favourite policy so that in the next elections the other candidate wins. We further provide an example for a consecutive change of power, in which there is a permanent switch of regimes created not by exogenous shocks or new information but simply by the interplay between policies and tastes.
Assuming, next, that electives are consensus politicians, we trace the changes in their policies which follow the changes in the public opinion. Clearly, without endogenising tastes and in the absence of shocks or new information, there is no reason for such politicians not to carry out a consistent policy, because there is no reason for changes in what the voters want. But endogenising tastes may result in an interesting pattern of policy changes. When the elective implements the policy that the majority of people favour, she initiates a dynamics that may result in a different distribution of preferences in the population, and hence in a change of the public opinion (i.e., the wish of the majority). As a consensus politician, she now follows the public opinion and adjusts her policy accordingly. This triggers a further change of opinions, and so on. We show, in particular, how this process may lead to a (popular) zig-zag policy.
Last, we ask what policy will make the leader most popular after the preferences adapt to that very policy. With such a policy, the public may initially be dissatisfied with the leader, as that policy is typically different from the one promised in the pre-election platform (which was devised to elicit the majority's support with the prevailing tastes at that time). However, the public will eventually appreciate the new policy when everybody's tastes adjust to the new regime. Consequently, the person elected may end up successful and popular at the end of her cadence and ensure her re-election: she will gain a reputation for being pragmatic -on account of deviating from her initial promises, but insisting on her correct vision and on account of implementing a successful policy, even if initially unpopular.
The Model
Consider a society with a large number of individuals. Individuals may have different innate abilities a i which are uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval, and there is a large number of individuals of each given ability.
A random matching process divides the population into groups. Within a group G of individuals, individual i 2 G has to choose an action out of a set of available actions X i . We denote by X G ¼ P i2G X i the set of action profiles within the group G. We denote by G i the set of groups in which individual i can take part.
The government has a set of policies p 2 P it can implement. Individual i's utility function U i : X G Â P ! R comes from a set of utility functions U i . Denote U G ¼ P i2G U i . We assume that individuals' types are observable. 9 That is in each group
2 X G be a Nash equilibrium of the game in the group G with the utility functions U.
10
Individual i's monetary payoff is P i : X G Â P ! R, where P i 2 U i . However, i's utility need not coincide with her monetary payoff. We have in mind a preference dynamics process, induced by socialisation and imitation of role models, in which individuals adopt the preferences of successful individuals with the same characteristic, when Ôsuccessful' is defined as having higher expected monetary payoffs across the possible group matchings. A steady state of such a process implies that given the policy p, the preferences
2 U satisfy the following condition
ð Þ i2I is a preference equilibrium if for every individual i 2 I 9 We assume perfect observability of types. Modifying this assumption will complicate the analysis but the logic of the arguments should carry through even when there is only some given probability of type observability.
10 More precisely, if the game with the utility profile U has several Nash equilibria, then x(U, p) is a selection out of this equilibria. In the detailed analysis below each utility profile U 2 U has a unique Nash equilibrium.
]
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where the expectation E G i is taken over the possible groups G i in which individual i can take part.
If both actions and preferences were the object of conscious choice, this model would be nothing but a standard two-stage game, in which the choice of preferences is followed by the choice of actions within the groups. However, we have in mind a categorical difference between actions and preferences. The actions X i consist of whatever individual i can consciously choose. Preferences, in contrast, are fundamentally different: one cannot impose on oneself a genuine change of heart nor anticipate a change of heart.
11 However, genuine changes of heart do happen in reality. We assume that such an adaptation occurs, unconsciously, so as to maximise the expected monetary payoff P i .
Payoffs, Policy Variables and Preferences
To permit a tractable analysis, we proceed with more specific assumptions about the payoff functions, preferences and policy issues. This will enable us to explore the implications of preference endogeneity for the political arena.
We assume that each group consists of a pair of individuals. Such a group may be thought of as a small firm. The actions x i 2 X i available to individual i in the group or firm may be interpreted as effort or the level of on-the-job training that the individual chooses. The alternative monetary cost of choosing the activity level x i is given by x 2 i . We further assume that there are two policy variables that the government controls. First, the government sets at the outset the level of publicly-financed infrastructure e that everyone can enjoy. This could be the level of public education, the transportation system, etc. The cost of supplying e is 1 2 e 2 . Infrastructure e increases the productivity of the activity level x i by ex i . The government may also choose to subsidise ex post the activity level x i with a monetary compensation of sx i to individual i.
Both infrastructure and the activity subsidy are financed by a per capita tax. This tax depends on the choices of activity levels of the individuals in the population through the overall subsidy they entail. However, since the economy is large, no two-person group of individuals can influence the per capita tax by their choice of actions in the group.
12
Given the policy choice (e, s) of the government, we assume that the monetary payoff gross of tax of individual i (whose ability is a i ) is
11 In other words, if there is anything an individual can consciously do in order to change her tastes, such a choice belongs, under our terminology, to the realm of actions. 12 The policies we consider in this model are type of output promoting policies but they have indirect redistribution effect. Direct redistribution policies that do no change the strategic interaction will not trigger preference dynamics.
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as a function of her activity level x i , the infrastructure e and the activity level x j of her group-mate. The first term describes the monetary value of the production enjoyed directly by i, where the return to her activity level x i is increasing in her innate ability a i and the activity level of her group-mate. The second term describes the subsidy she receives from the government. The third term describes the alternative monetary cost of choosing the activity level x i within the group. However, i's preferences need not be represented by her monetary payoff function. We assume that the individual may also derive non-monetary satisfaction (or frustration) directly from her activity x i . Explicitly, we assume that i's utility function has the form U i ðx i ; x j ; a i ; s i ; e; sÞ ¼ P i ðx i ; x j ; a i ; e; sÞ þ s i x i :
By varying s i 2 R we get the entire set U i of possible utility functions of individual i.
We denote by x i ða i ; a j ; s i ; s j ; e; sÞ; x j ða j ; a i ; s j ; s i ; e; sÞ Â Ã the (unique) Nash equilibrium activity levels 13 in the group. We denote the equilibrium monetary payoff of individual i in this interaction by f i ða i ; a j ; s i ; s j ; e; sÞ ¼ P i x i ða i ; a j ; s i ; s j ; e; sÞ; x j ða j ; a i ; s j ; s i ; e; sÞ; a i ; e; s Â Ã :
Preference Equilibrium
At a preference equilibrium, the coefficient s i adjusts so as to maximise the monetary expected payoff of i (across her possible matches with a group-mate), given the adjustment of the coefficients of individuals with other abilities. This captures the idea that among the possible coefficients for those individuals with ability a i , the one which will eventually become dominant, due to education or imitation of role-models, is the one who ultimately maximises the material success. Specifically, for a given infrastructure level e and subsidy level s, the utility functions 
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Proof. See the Appendix. The equilibrium coefficients s Ã i ða i ; e; sÞ describe the non-monetary benefits individuals may have from their activity level x i . If the interpretation of this activity is on-the-job training, then the coefficients describe their satisfaction from being well trained or being better trained relative to other workers. Part (ii) of the proposition points out an interesting property. At equilibrium the coefficient is increasing with the individual's own ability and with infrastructure and subsidy. Increasing e (infrastructure), besides its direct effect on payoffs, also increases the equilibrium coefficient of all individuals in this economy, i.e. it increases their non-monetary benefits from the economic activity. Moreover, increasing e induces individuals to increase their x i as it can be seen from the payoff function (1). But this is only the direct effect. An increase in infrastructure causes an increase of the coefficient s Ã i ða i ; e; sÞ of the non-monetary benefits from training and thus induces the individuals to increase their x i even further. Similarly, individuals with higher ability have greater incentives to choose a higher x i , but beside the direct incentives at equilibrium they are going to have a higher equilibrium coefficient s Ã i , which induces them to increase x i even further.
14
We denote the Nash equilibrium activity levels in a firm in which the individuals' abilities are (a i , a j ) by Given our balanced-budget assumption, the government needs to finance its infrastructure and its economic activity subsidy by imposing the appropriate per capita tax. The level of such a tax will therefore be
j ; a i ; e; sÞ h i da i da j :
Individuals' Evaluation of Policy Change
As explained in the introduction, we assume that when individuals form their opinions about the implications of policy change, they are unable to go through the mental exercise regarding the future adaptation of their preferences. This is why actions and payoffs are evaluated given the individual's current preferences and given the current distribution of preferences in the population. It follows that when (e 0 , s 0 ) are the current levels of infrastructure and subsidy, and s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 Þ is the associated coefficient at the preference equilibrium, individuals believe that if and when different levels of (e, s) are implemented, the corresponding Nash equilibrium actions will be 14 s Ã i is typically different than zero due to its commitment value for the individual. With s Ã i 6 ¼ 0, the individual loses by deviating from material-payoff maximisation, but he gains even more by the effect s Ã i has on the Nash equilibrium behaviour of his group-mate.
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[ However, this will be the case only in the short run. In the long run the new policies (e, s) will affect the coefficients s i of the preference equilibrium, which will adjust to their new equilibrium level s Ã i ða i ; e; sÞ.
Policy Issues and Political Equilibrium
The role of the government in our model is to determine the level of infrastructure e, direct subsidy for intra-group activity, s, and financing these expenses by levying a per capita tax. We assume a democratic regime with two parties. The levels of infrastructure and subsidy are the only issues of public debate. Moreover, we assume that in each round of elections only one of these issues is of central concern, so that the elected candidate is the one whose platform regarding the issue at stake is favoured by most voters. 15 We denote by (e 0 , s 0 ) the pre-elections policy, and assume that the coefficients s i of the utility functions U i are at the equilibrium levels s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 Þ, which correspond to this initial policy. Given any policy (e 0 , s 0 ) and the preference equilibrium coefficients s E(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; s) is the optimal infrastructure level for an individual with ability a i given the equilibrium coefficient s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 Þ and given the subsidy level s.
15 Clearly there are elections in which there are several dominant issues. In principle the underlying dynamic process that we present in this article also exists when there are several issues, although it will be less tractable.
] 253
Similarly S(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; e) is the optimal subsidy for the same individual given the infrastructure level e.
Proposition 2 (i)Ĥ i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 ; e; sÞ are single-peaked in each of the policy variables e, s. (ii) The preferred level of infrastructure E(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; s 0 ) by an individual with ability a i when the subsidy level is s 0 , and her preferred level of subsidy S(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; e 0 ) when the infrastructure level is e 0 are both monotonic in the ability a i .
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 has two parts. The first asserts that preferences over policy variables are single-peaked, which simplifies our political equilibrium analysis. Second, we have the interesting property that people with higher ability wish to have higher levels of infrastructure and subsidy for economic activity.
Conviction Politicians
We start by analysing the model under the assumption that politicians' platforms represent their convictions, and that they are committed to implement these convictions if and when they are elected. We assume that there are only two candidates, both of whom are conviction politicians, and we explore the implications of the preference dynamics on the popularity of candidates and leaders and on the pattern of public voting.
We demonstrate two possible effects in this Section. The first is reinforced political stability in which once the preferences adjust in response to the policy implemented by the chosen candidate, the elective in office becomes more popular relative to the opposition leader. The second is political instability in which the implementation of the policy advocated by the elective triggers a preference dynamics that makes this policy unpopular relative to the policy suggested by the opposition. Moreover, as we demonstrate below, the latter possibility may entail a political cycle, under which the government changes from Ôright' to Ôleft' and vice versa in each round of elections. This instability is not due to any external shock which influences the objective features of economic interaction; neither is it due to any information which is revealed to the public or to the politicians over time. Rather, it is implied by the very nature of the economic activity and the intervening policy, via their endogenous implications on the individuals' intrinsic motives at work.
Reinforcing Platforms: Political Stability
Consider a society in which there is no direct subsidy for within-firm activities; i.e., s 0 ¼ 0. The policy variable which is under public debate is infrastructure. The initial level of infrastructure is assumed to be e 0 . There are two possible parties, headed by two conviction politicians. One party is committed to the existing level of infrastructure; e 0 , while the second party supports changing the level to e 1 .
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Proposition 3 (Political Stability). Assume a zero subsidy rate s 0 ¼ 0, an initial level of infrastructure e 0 , and an alternative suggested policy e ¼ e 1 . If, with the preference coefficients s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 Þ induced by the current policy, most people prefer e 1 over e 0 , then most people will also prefer e 1 over e 0 once e 1 is implemented and the coefficients adjust to their new equilibrium levels s Ã i ða i ; e 1 ; s 0 Þ.
Proof. Since, by Proposition 2,Ĥ i ða i ;ẽ; s 0 ; e; sÞ is single-peaked as a function of e and the maximiser is monotonic in a i , it follows that a majority of people prefer e 1 over e 0 when the coefficients are s Ã i ða i ;ẽ; s 0 Þ if and only if the median voter, with ability a i ¼ 1 2 , prefers e 1 over e 0 . This is the case when
2 ;ẽ; s 0 ; e; sÞ is quadratic in e.
which is increasing inẽ. Therefore e 1 À e 0 has the same sign as E This means that if the median voter (and hence most people) prefers e 1 over e 0 with the coefficients s Ã j ða j ; e 0 ; 0Þ, she continues to prefer e 1 over e 0 with the adjusted coefficients s Ã j ða j ; e 1 ; 0Þ. Proposition 3 gives an example of situations with endogenous political stability. Changing infrastructure to the level of e 1 indeed induces an endogenous change of preferences, but under the new preference equilibrium the majority of people still prefer the policy e 1 over the old policy e 0 . This does not mean that there will not be any further changes in the regime. However in order to beat the incumbent party one needs to come up with new infrastructure policy recommendations.
Self-defeating Platforms: Political Instability
We will now try to illustrate the reverse case of political instability. In such a case the implementation of a new policy entails longing for the old regime. For this example consider a society in which infrastructure is fixed at the level of e 0 ¼ 1 and is not subject to political debate. The two political parties support two different levels of subsidies s 0 and s 1 .
] 255
Proposition 4 (Political Instability). Assume a unit level of infrastructure e 0 ¼ 1. There is a continuum of policy pairs s 1 < 0 < s 0 such that if the parties' platforms promise subsidy rates s 0 , s 1 , respectively, then most people prefer s 1 (i.e. a tax) over s 0 with their initial coefficients s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 0 Þ, but most people prefer s 0 over s 1 once their coefficients adjust to their new equilibrium levels s Ã i ða i ; e 0 ; s 1 Þ.
Proof. Since, by Proposition 2,Ĥ i ða i ; e 0 ;s; e; sÞ is single-peaked as a function of s and the maximiser is monotonic in a i , it follows that a majority of people prefer s 00 over s 0 when the coefficients are s Consider the inequalities
or, explicitly,
there is a range of values s 1 satisfying these inequalities, and for such s 1 it is also the case that
Hence for s 0 > À 2 5 and s 1 in range (5), inequality (3) implies that (2) obtains with s 00 ¼ s 1 , s 0 ¼ s 0 ands ¼ s 0 , while inequality (4) implies that (2) obtains with
In other words, the median voter (and hence the majority of voters) prefers s 1 over s 0 with the coefficient s Proposition 4 demonstrates a scenario in which an elected politician, by implementing the policy in which she believes and advocates, actually initiates a process of preference change that ultimately leads to her failure in the next elections. In such a case there is an inherent political instability which is due to the preference dynamics induced by the different policies.
Permanent Political Instability
Consider a society in which infrastructure is constant and given at the level e 0 ¼ 1. Further assume that there are two parties in this society; ÔLeft' and ÔRight' which are committed to the subsidy levels s L and s R respectively. If the positions of the two parties are Ôopposed in a balanced way' -one advocating a subsidy and the other advocating tax, a political cycle will emerge, in which ÔRight' subsumes ÔLeft' and vice versa in each round of elections. The following corollary is an immediate implication of Proposition 4.
Corollary 1 (Political Cycle). Assume a unit level of infrastructure e 0 ¼ 1. There is a continuum of policy pairs s 1 < 0 < s 0 such that if the parties' platforms promise subsidy rates s L ¼ s 0 and s R ¼ s 1 , the parties will switch power in each round of elections, assuming that by the end of each cadence the preferences have adjusted to the equilibrium levels pertaining to the prevailing subsidy policys.
The situation described in Corollary 1 of permanent instability and constant switching of political regimes illustrates an interesting problem that may arise in settings with endogenous preferences. It is a situation in which individuals are never satisfied with their current regime and permanently wish to change it. The implementation of s L triggers a preference dynamics that makes the majority of individuals wish to have s R and vice versa.
Consensus Politicians
In the previous Section we assumed that the platforms of the two parties are fixed and that, by conviction, once a candidate is elected she indeed implements the policy promised by her ticket. We now turn to explore the implementation of policies when leaders are consensus politicians that adapt their platforms in an attempt to be popular and get elected. Moreover, we assume that once in office, the leader may implement a different policy than she initially promised, or change the policy in the course of her cadence following the popularity of different policies among their constituencies.
By the Ômedian voter theorem' and Proposition 2, a candidate can guarantee her election by promising the policy most preferred by the median voter; i.e., the individual with ability a i ¼ 1 2 . If the pre-elections prevailing policy is (e 0 , s 0 ), then given the monotonicity of E(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; s 0 ) and S(a i ; e 0 , s 0 ; e 0 ) in a i (see Proposition 2006 ] 257
2) the policy that will guarantee winning the elections is E 1 2 ; e 0 ; s 0 ; s 0 À Á when the level of infrastructure is of major concern, or S 1 2 ; e 0 ; s 0 ; e 0 À Á when the subsidy level is at stake.
However, if this promised policy is different from the prevailing one, its implementation will trigger a change of preferences. This means that in order to please her people, the politician in office may need to implement a different policy from the one she promised before the elections.
Thus, in this Section we do not consider the political instability that is derived from switches of ruling parties or leaders, but rather the instability associated with changes of policies by leaders that seek to be popular or strive to get re-elected. We will focus on the pattern of the endogenous change of the popular policy.
Following Public Opinion
One type of a consensus leader is a leader that chooses a policy according to current public opinion. That is, when people's preferences adjust the leader implements a new policy pleasing the majority of the public (or equivalently pleasing the median voter). However, every policy change will lead to yet another change of preferences, hence the leader is bound to change her policy again in order to maintain her popularity. This, however, is not an example of a politician that does not keep her campaign promises. On the contrary, after the elections the campaign promises are kept and the politician implements the strategy she advocated, but then the policy is Ômodified' as public opinion changes. What will be the nature of these policy adjustments? In our model, this depends on the type of the policy variable.
3.1.1. Monotonic policy adjustments When the policy variable is the level of public education, the resulting sequence of policy changes will be monotonic, resulting in a sequence of successive augmentations or successive reductions. Specifically, Proposition 5 A popular rise in the infrastructure level following public opinion will result in a change of preferences and public cry for another rise, and vice versa. That is, if 
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[ and vice versa. Proposition 6 provides an example for a zig-zag policy which arises endogenously from the elected's concern about her popularity. Interestingly, this zig-zag public policy is not necessarily unpopular although the elected does not necessarily follow her campaign promise. She can always justify her zig-zag policy by a zig-zag in the public opinion. 
The Unpopular Way to Populism
Alternatively, if the politician in office is able to forecast the preference dynamics, she may try to implement immediately the policy which will eventually please the median voter. If the infrastructure level is the main issue, this is the Ôfixed point' education level satisfying
Similarly, if the subsidy level is the central issue, it will be the subsidy rate satisfying
With such a policy, the public will initially be dissatisfied with the leader, as the policy is different than the one promised in the platform (which solicited the median voter and ensured popularity). However, the public will eventually appreciate the new policy as everybody's preferences adjust to the new regime. Consequently, the leader may end up successful and popular at the end of her cadence and ensure her re-election. The policy change needed in the latter strategy may be more or less extreme than in the former, depending on the policy variable at stake:
Proposition 7 (i) When changing the level of infrastructure, following public opinion requires a less extreme policy change than implementing the eventually-popular policy:
(ii) When changing the subsidy rate, following public opinion requires a more extreme policy change than implementing the eventually-popular policy:
Proof. See Appendix.
Concluding Remarks
One of the difficulties facing politicians is that public opinion keeps changing. A policy that is popular today becomes unpopular tomorrow. Changing public opinion reflects the dynamics of our life. Public opinion may change as a result of new events, realisations of uncertainties or changes in the population. Beside these well documented changes of public opinion, the view taken in this article is that there are also some inherent endogenous concerns which are the outcome of the interplay between the economic implications of different policies and the formation of tastes. Leaders that were elected by promising one policy may become unpopular not because of a change of circumstances or new information regarding the policy or the leader, but rather because the policy induces an endogenous change of heart which affects the popularity of different policies. One of the concerns in modelling preference dynamics is the time frame needed for such changes. The dynamics involving preference change might be slower than the political cycle of elections. This, however, does not imply that it is not relevant. It is possible that a policy implemented by one leader induces a preference dynamics and that, before these dynamics settle down completely, the society is going to face a new round of elections. But even in such a case opinions are affected by policy implementation and thus may affect, in turn, the outcome of the upcoming elections. As a modelling approach we assume that the preferences
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dynamics are settled before the elections, as we need a form of analytical discipline in order to evaluate the popularity of different policies. However, the validity of our main message stands out independently of this modelling choice. Additionally, political cycles may be longer than the four-year election cycle. There are parties with clear views that face one another every four years but the effect of preference dynamics is realised only after several rounds of elections. The material payoff to a i in this interaction (gross of the tax) is f i ða i ; a j ; s i ; s j ; e; sÞ ¼ e þ s þ a i þ 1 2
So if K is the current average of j j in the population and V is its variance, the average monetary payoff to a i when she has the coefficient s i is f i ða i ; s i ; e; sÞ Z f i ða i ; a j ; s i ; s j ; e; sÞdj
The best (monetary-wise on average) coefficient s i for a i to have is therefore 
